Abstract: We investigate resilient control strategies for linear systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. By DoS attacks we mean interruptions of communication on measurement (sensor-to-controller) and/or control (controller-to-actuator) channels carried out by an intelligent adversary. We characterize the duration of these interruptions under which stability of the closed-loop system is preserved. The resilient nature of the control descends from its ability to adapt the sampling rate to the occurrence of the DoS.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing interest concerning feedback control systems that are implemented over communication networks. These networks impose that measurements are acquired at discrete times, transmitted and received by the controller. The latter processes the received information and computes the control signal. This can in turn be sampled and transmitted to the actuators. Common limitations on these signals that travel over a network are quantization, delays and loss of information. Due to the limited bandwidth of the communication channel, as well as possible constraints on the available computational power, much research has been devoted to reduce the use of the communication line, by designing the sampling sequence based on current status of the process to control. This has given raise to a very active line of research in the context of event/self-triggering control; see Heemels, Johansson, and Tabuada (2012) for a recent comprehensive overview of the topic.
In the literature, several aspects of event/self-triggering control have been investigated, including output-feedback (Donkers and Heemels (2010) ), robustness against additive disturbances (Mazo Jr, Anta, and Tabuada (2010) ), largescale systems (Wang and Lemmon (2011) ; De Persis, Sailer, and Wirth (2013) ) and distributed coordinated control (Seyboth, Dimarogonas, and Johansson (2013) ; De Persis and Frasca (2013) ), to name a few. On the other hand, an aspect of primary importance for which less results are available is the robustness of such schemes against malicious attacks.
Attacks to computer networks have become ever more prevalent over the last few years. In this respect, one of the (if not the) most common type of attack is the socalled Denial-of-Service (DoS, for short); see Byres and Lowe (2004) for an introduction to the topic. It consists in a radio interference signal (also known as jamming signal) which is primarily intended to affect the timeliness of the information exchange, i.e. to cause packet losses. While networked control formulations have previously considered sensor/control packet losses (Schenato, Sinopoli, Franceschetti, Poolla, and Sastry (2007) ), dealing with DoS phenomena requires fundamentally different analysis tools. In fact, in contrast with classical networked control systems where packet losses can be reasonably modeled as random events, assuming a stochastic characterization of the DoS attacks would be inherently limiting in that it would fail to capture the malicious and intelligent nature of an attacker.
Prompted by these considerations, this paper discusses the problem of controlling networked systems subject to DoS attacks, whose underlying strategy is unknown. More specifically, we consider a classical sampled-data control system consisting of a continuous-time linear process in feedback loop with a digital controller. An attacker, according to some unknown strategy, can interrupt both sensor and control communication channels. Under such circumstances, the process evolves under out-of-date control. Within this context, we address the question of designing control update rules that are capable of ensuring closedloop stability in the event that DoS does not occur too frequently 1 . In this respect, the main contribution of this paper is to show that suitable control update rules do exist whenever the ratio between the "active" and "sleeping" periods of jamming is small enough on the average. This somehow reminds of stability problems for systems that switch between stable and unstable modes; see e.g. Zhai, Hu, Yasuda, and Michel (2000) . In our paper, however, the peculiarity of the problem under study leads to a different analysis and results. We also show that the results here introduced are flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options that can be used to trade-off performance vs. communication resources. Although these solutions originate from fundamentally different approaches, they exhibit the common feature of resilience, by which we mean the possibility to adapt the sampling rate to the DoS occurrence.
Previous contributions to this research line have been reported in Amin, Càrdenas, and Sastry (2009) ; Gupta, Langbort, and Başar (2010) . In these papers, however, the framework is substantially different. They consider a pure discrete-time setting in which the goal is to find optimal control and attack strategies assuming a maximum number of jamming actions over a prescribed (finite) control horizon. Here, we do not formulate the problem as an optimal control design problem. The controller can be designed according to any suitable design method, robustness and resilience against DoS attacks being achieved thanks to the design of the control update rule. Perhaps, the closest references to our research is Foroush and Martínez (2013) . In that paper, the authors consider a situation in which the attack strategy is known to be periodic, though of unknown period and duration. The goal is then to identify period and duration of the jamming activity so as to determine the time-intervals where communication is possible. Their framework should be therefore looked at as complementary more than alternative to the present one, since the former deals with cases where one can adjust the control updates so that they never fall into the jamming activity periods. Such a feature is conceptually impossible to achieve in scenarios such as the one considered in this paper, where the jamming strategy is neither known nor prefixed (the attacker can modify on-line the attack strategy).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the class of DoS signals which are of interest in this paper and formulate the control problem. The main result with a characterization of the class of DoS signals under which stability is preserved is given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses implementation issues and presents a number of resilient control strategies. In Appendix A, we report an alternative Lyapunov-based treatment of the main result.
Proofs of the main result and the auxiliary lemmas are reported in Appendix B.
FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEM OVERVIEW
The framework of interest can be schematically represented as in Figure 1 . Specifically, we consider a remote plant-operator setup, in which the process to be controlled is described by the differential equatioṅ
where t ∈ R ≥0 ; x ∈ R nx is the state and u ∈ R nu is the control input; A and B are matrices of appropriate size. We assume that a state-feedback matrix K has been designed rendering the closed-loop system stable in the sense of Lyapunov, i.e. such that all the eigenvalues of A + BK have negative real part.
The control action is implemented via a sample-andhold device. Let {t k }, k ∈ N, t 0 := 0 by convention, represent the sequence of time instants at which it is desired to update the control action. At the present stage, for simplicity of exposition, we shall simply refer to the "Logic" block as the device responsible for generating {t k }. Accordingly, whatever the logic underlying this block, in the ideal situation where data can be sent and received at any desired instant of time, the control input applied to the process is given by 
We shall refer to Denial-of-Service (DoS, for short) as the phenomenon that may prevent (2) from being applied over certain time periods. In principle, such a phenomenon can affect both control (controller-to-actuator) and measurement (sensor-to-controller) channels. In this paper, we consider the case of a DoS simultaneously affecting both control and measurement channels. This amounts to assuming that, in the presence of DoS, data can be neither sent nor received. To make this concept precise, let {h n }, n ∈ N, h 0 ≥ 0, represent the sequence of DoS positive edge-triggering 2 and
with τ n > 0, the corresponding DoS n-th time-interval. In this respect, we shall assume that over each H n the actuator generates an input that is based on the most recently received control signal. Accordingly, let
denote the last (up to the current time) DoS positive edgetriggering, and let
denote the last (up to the current time) successful control update. Then, the actual control input applied to the process is given by
The possible presence of DoS also raises the question of assigning a value for control input in case h 0 = 0, i.e. when communication is not possible at the process startup. In this respect, in case h 0 = 0, we shall assume that u(0) = 0 and let x(t −1 ) := 0 for notational consistency. Remark 1. It would be possible to consider an alternative framework in which the input to the process is always zero during DoS intervals (Gupta et al., 2010) . As will become clear in the following, the latter can be regarded as a simplified variant of the framework in which, upon DoS, the process input is based on the most recently received control signal. ✷
Problem overview
To begin with, it is convenient to introduce the following definition. Definition 1. Consider the control system Σ composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6). Σ is said to be globally exponentially stable (GES) if there exist α, β ∈ R >0 such that
for all t ∈ R ≥0 and for all x(0) ∈ R nx , where · stands for Euclidean norm. ✷
Various approaches have been considered assuring GES to the control system in the absence of DoS; e.g., see Heemels et al. (2012) for recent results and a discussion on questions related to periodic vs aperiodic implementations.
A natural question then arises on whether mechanisms do exist that are capable of preserving GES for certain DoS signals.
In this respect, some preliminary considerations are in order. Whatever the rule generating the {t k }-sequence, ultimate goal of the "Logic" block is to update the control action frequently enough so that stability is not destroyed. While in principle this is always possible in the absence of DoS 3 , the same conclusions do not hold if DoS is allowed to be arbitrary. For instance, for open-loop unstable systems, one immediately sees that if τ 0 = ∞ then stability is lost irrespective of how {t k } is chosen. These points motivate the following restriction on the admissible DoS signals considered throughout the paper.
Given a sequence {h n }, let
denote the sum of DoS intervals up to the current time, and, given an interval I, let |I| denote its length. Assumption 1. The DoS sequence {h n }, n ∈ N, is such that inf n∈N τ n > 0. Moreover, there exist constants κ ∈ R ≥0 and τ ∈ R >0 such that
for all t ∈ R ≥0 . ✷ Remark 2. Condition inf n∈N τ n > 0 ensures that {h n } is sufficiently "regular". In particular, it implies that {h n } is non-Zeno and that an infinite number of DoS intervals does always have strictly positive Lebesgue measure. Inequality (9) expresses the property that the DoS satisfies a slow-on-the-average type condition, as introduced by Hespanha and Morse (1999) for hybrid systems analysis. In the present context, the rationale behind (9) is that if κ = 0 then the average time interval of DoS is at least τ . On the other hand, κ > 0 allows for consideration of DoS at the process start-up, i.e. when h 0 = 0. ✷ Remark 3. The considered framework differs from classical networked systems where information loss can be, for instance, assumed to follow some suitable stochastic distribution; e.g., see Schenato et al. (2007) . In fact, concepts such as DoS, cyber-physical security/resilience are mainly oriented towards scenarios where communication loss can result from threats of a malicious nature. This is the primary motivation for not assuming {h n } to follow a specific distribution or pattern. ✷
MAIN RESULTS
In this section, a simple control update rule is considered, which is capable of preserving GES for any DoS signal satisfying Assumption 1 with τ sufficiently large. A discussion on the results along with implementation aspects is deferred to the next section.
Let
where t ∈ R ≥0 , represent the error between the value of the process state at the last successful control update and the value of the process state at the current time. Consistent with the comments made right after (6), if h 0 = 0 then e(t) = −x(t) for all t ∈ H 0 . The closed-loop system composed of (1) and (6) can be therefore rewritten aṡ
where Φ := A + BK. Consider now the following control update rule
where σ ∈ R >0 is a free design parameter. As shown hereafter, such an update rule is capable of preserving GES for any DoS signal satisfying Assumption 1 with τ sufficiently large.
Condition (12) was first introduced in Tabuada (2007) in the context of event-based control. The difference here is that, due to the presence of DoS, one cannot enforce this condition for all t ≥ 0, but only over those time-intervals where communication is indeed possible.
To fix the ideas, it is convenient to briefly comment on a possible implementation of condition (12), referring the interested reader to Section 4 for a thorough discussion and possible variations. The simplest architecture one can think of for implementing (12) is that depicted in Figure  2 (a). The "Logic" block measures continuously the state x, computes the error signal e and detects the instants t k at which (12) holds with the equality relation. At these instants, the logic samples the state and attempt to transmit it to the controller. In accordance with (10), if the control update is successful then e is reset to zero.
If instead an acknowledgment is not received, then the logic infers that the packet is lost, that is, t k ∈ H n for some n ∈ N. Under such circumstances, the logic turns to a different operating mode by continuously attempting to update the control action, as depicted in Figure 2 (b). In this way, at time h n + τ n when communication is restored, the logic is able to transmit immediately the sampled measurement so that (12) is enforced.
In the following subsection, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that this is indeed the case. In practice, when implementing (12) on a digital platform, due to the finite sampling rate, a time interval will necessarily elapse from the time h n + τ n at which DoS is over, to the time at which the logic successfully samples and transmits. As anticipated, this case will be addressed in full details in Section 4.
Stability analysis
We now study the trajectories of the closed-loop system composed of (1) and (6) with control update law (12). An alternative approach to stability analysis, based on Lyapunov functions, is discussed in Appendix A.
Observe first that Φ is a stability matrix by hypothesis. Then there exist µ ∈ R ≥1 and λ ∈ R >0 such that e Φt ≤ µe −λt for all t ∈ R ≥0 , where µ and λ can be easily computed using algebraic matrix theory. This, in turns, implies
ω 2 e −λ(t−s) e(s) ds
having defined Θ(t) := [0, t)\Ξ(t), ω 1 := µ x(0) and ω 2 := µ BK where, given a matrix M , M denotes its spectral norm. We now evaluate the integral terms of the above formula separately.
Consider first the interval Θ(t), over which (12) holds by construction. The corresponding integral term can be therefore upper bounded as
where ω 3 := σω 2 .
Consider next Ξ(t). In this case, some intermediate steps are needed. To begin with, we avail ourselves of the following lemma. Lemma 1. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6) with control update rule (12). Then
for all n ∈ N. ✷ Consider the n-th DoS interval H n . Over each H n , the process dynamics are governed bẏ In addition, there exist θ ∈ R ≥1 and ρ ∈ R ≥0 such that e
At
≤ θe ρt for all t ∈ R ≥0 4 . Using (15) and (16), it is then straightforward to verify that, over each DoS interval, the solution to the closed-loop dynamics can be upper bounded as
having defined θ 1 =: θ(1 + σ) BK and θ 2 =: θ + θ 1 /ρ. Recalling the definition of Ξ(t), let
denote the length of the last DoS interval up to time t. In (13), the contribution to the evolution of the state by each DoS interval can be upper bounded as follows
for all n ∈ N with n ≤ n(t), where the second inequality follows from (15) and (18) with ω 4 =: ω 2 (1 + σ) + ω 2 θ 2 ; the last equality holds by letting ω * (ρ) =: ω 4 /(λ + ρ).
Notice that by increasing ρ if necessary one can always assume that (20) holds with ω * (ρ) ≤ 1. Specifically, let ρ be any positive scalar such that e At ≤ θe ρt for all t ∈ R ≥0 with θ ∈ R ≥1 . Then, by letting
δ n (t) := e (λ+ρ * )τn(t) − 1 (22) one can always rewrite (20) as
Hence, the last integral term of (13) can be finally upper bounded as
δ n (t)e −λ(t−hn) x(h n ) (24) Combining (13), (14) and (24), the following results can be established. Theorem 1. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6). Let Φ = A + BK, with µ ∈ R ≥1 and λ ∈ R >0 positive constants satisfying e Φt ≤ µe −λt for all t ∈ R ≥0 . Let the control update rule satisfy (12) with λ − σµ BK > 0
Then, Σ is GES for any DoS sequence {h n } satisfying Assumption 1 with
where ρ * is as in (21). In particular, under the stated conditions, (7) holds true with constants α = µe κ(λ+ρ * ) and β = λ − σµ BK − (λ + ρ * )/τ . ✷ Remark 4. The constraint (25) must be satisfied even in the absence of DoS. It reflects the fact that, even when communication is always possible, in order to achieve stability, the control action must be updated frequently enough. On the other hand, (32) imposes constraints on the admissible DoS signals. In this respect, notice that in contrast with hybrid system analysis where τ is allowed to take on values less than one, here τ must always be greater than one. Such a constraint is consistent with intuition, reflecting the fact that, to achieve stability, the total length of DoS intervals must be a suitable fraction of the time (in fact, |Ξ(t)| ≤ t/τ when κ = 0). ✷ Remark 5. At the expense of possibly larger overshoots and more frequent control updates, one can always design the control system so as to tolerate any DoS signal not exceeding a prescribed fraction of time. Specifically, for any givenτ > 1, one can always design K yielding a nominal decaying rate λ large enough for the right hand side of (32) to be strictly less thanτ . While this will possibly result in a large value of µ BK , condition (25) can be still satisfied by properly selecting σ. ✷
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESILIENT CONTROL LOGICS
The analysis of Section 3 hinges upon the fulfillment of condition (12). Such a condition cannot be directly implemented on digital platforms in that, in order to be fulfilled, it would require continuous transmission attempts upon DoS detection, i.e. an infinite sampling rate. Motivated by this, we first discuss how Theorem 1 can be generalized so as to possibly account for finite sampling rate constraints.
Building upon Theorem 1, we finally consider a number of implementation possibilities that can be used to tradeoff performance vs. communication resources within the proposed framework.
Stability under finite sampling rate
We first consider the following definition. Definition 2. A control update sequence {t k } is said to occur at a finite sampling rate if there exist an ε ∈ R >0 such that
✷ Consider now a control update sequence {t k } along with a DoS sequence {h n }, and let
28) denote the set of integers associated with an attempt to update the control action during H n . Accordingly, by defining
will provide an upper bound on the n-th time interval over which the control action is not updated, whilē
will provide an upper bound on the total interval up to the current time over which the control action is not updated. Equation (30) essentially models the additional delay in the control update that may arise under finite sampling rate. In fact, under (27), ∆ Sn will be greater than or hn h n+1 h n+1 Fig. 3 . Two DoS sequences (in dashed line) of equal total length. The one at the top, composed of more intervals having smaller duration, denies more communications attempts than the one at the bottom.
equal to ε so that |H n | will be strictly greater than |H n |.
Notice that (30) is non-conservative in the senseH n may be exactly equivalent to the n-th time interval over which the control action is not updated. One may in fact have situations where a control update is requested just before the time h n + τ n at which the n-th DoS interval is over and the next sampling time is scheduled at h n + τ n + ∆ Sn . Such a case cannot be ruled out being h n and τ n unknown.
With this definition in place, the following result can be stated which extends the conclusions of Theorem 1 to control update sequences possibly occurring at a finite sampling rate. To avoid confusion, it is worth pointing out that the result which follows is only concerned with the effects of lower bounding {∆ k } upon communication loss. Logics satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2 with explicit lower and upper bounds for ∆ * are discussed in the next subsection. Theorem 2. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6). Let Φ = A + BK, with µ ∈ R ≥1 and λ ∈ R >0 positive constants satisfying e Φt ≤ µe −λt for all t ∈ R ≥0 . Let the control update rule satisfy (12) with Ξ(t) replaced byΞ(t), where σ is as in (25). Then, Σ is GES for any DoS sequence {h n } satisfying Assumption 1 with
where
and
In particular, under the stated conditions, (7) holds true with constants α = µe (λ+ρ * )(1+∆ * /τ * )κ and β = λ − σµ BK − (λ + ρ * )(1 + ∆ * /τ * )/τ . ✷ Remark 6. Theorem 2 differs from Theorem 1 not only because of ∆ * but also due to the presence of τ * . This has a very intuitive explanation. In fact, in the ideal case considered in Theorem 1, ∆ * = 0 since a control update can always occur as soon as DoS is over. Under finite sampling rate, each DoS interval will instead possibly introduce an additional delay in the control update. Accordingly, given two DoS sequences of equal total length, the one composed of more intervals having smaller duration will be more critical for stability, since it will potentially deny more communications attempts, as depicted in Figure 3 . This can also be seen from (32): the smaller τ * , the larger the value of τ required to achieve stability. ✷
Implementation and resilient control logics
The framework introduced with Theorem 2 is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options, some of which are described in the following. Although these solutions originate from fundamentally different approaches, they exhibit the common feature of resilience, by which we mean not only to ensure a certain degree of robustness against DoS, but also the ability to counteract it by changing the control update rule upon communication loss.
Event/Time-driven logics. As discussed in Section 3, the simplest architecture one can think of consists in using a"Logic" block that measures continuously the state x, computes the error signal e and detects the instants (events) at which e(t) = σ x(t) (35) At these instants, the logic samples the process state and attempt to transmit it to the controller. If an acknowledgment is not received, the logic turns to a different operating mode and attempts to update the control action periodically 5 . This is formalized in the next result. Proposition 1. Let ∆ 1 be a positive scalar less than or equal to ∆ 2 , with ∆ 2 given by φ(∆ 2 ) = σ, the latter being the unique solution at ∆ 2 of the generalized scalar Riccati equatioṅ
initialized at φ(0) = 0, where Φ = A + BK. Then, the control update rule
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆ * = ∆ 1 and
Purely time-driven logics. The rationale behind (37) is that, upon DoS detection, transmission is attempted at the sampling rate specified by ∆ 1 , while, in the absence of DoS, less frequent control updates are allowed. This mechanism has the positive feature of potentially saving communication resources but requires continuous process state monitoring. Unless dedicated hardware is available for this purpose, it is convenient to search for purely timedriven logics in which the "Logic" block is embedded in the control unit, as depicted in Figure 4 . . Implementation for time-driven and self-triggering policies with the "Logic" block embedded in the control unit. One possible solution is captured in the next result, whose proof follows directly from Proposition 1. Proposition 2. Let ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 be positive scalars with ∆ 1 ≤ ∆ 2 and ∆ 2 as in Proposition 1. Then, the control update rule
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆ * = ∆ 1 and ∆ k ≥ ∆ 1 for all k ∈ N. ✷ Self-triggering logics. As a final possibility, we note that purely time-driven logics can be relaxed to more flexible aperiodic implementations by letting ∆ k to take values based on the available data. Logics of this kind are typically referred to as "self-triggering" in that the next update instant is computed directly by the control unit. Let t 1 , t 2 ∈ R ≥0 with t 2 ≥ t 1 ≥ 0 and define
Thus χ(t k , t k(t) ) provides a prediction of x(t k ) based on the last successful measurement x(t k(t) ). Thus, one can set ∆ k depending on the magnitude of χ(t k , t k(t) ) : the larger χ(t k , t k(t) ) the smaller ∆ k and viceversa, which corresponds to increasing the sampling rate as the distance of the process state from the origin gets larger.
Then the next result holds, which follows again from Proposition 1 6 .
Proposition 3. Let ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 be positive scalars with ∆ 1 ≤ ∆ 2 and ∆ 2 as in Proposition 1. Let ϕ : R ≥0 → [0, 1], be a class K function. Then, the control update rule
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆ * = ∆ 1 and ∆ k ≥ ∆ 1 for all k ∈ N. ✷
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied resilient control strategies for linear systems under DoS. We have shown that to conclude asymptotic stability, DoS signals must not be active for more than a certain percentage of time on the average. The resilient nature of the proposed control strategy descends from its ability to adapt the sampling rate to the state of the process and to the occurrence of DoS attacks. The results lend themselves to be extended in various directions. We have not investigated the effect of possible limitations on the information, such as disturbances, quantization and delays, and leave the topic for future investigation. As additional future research topics, we envision the use of similar techniques to handle the problem in the presence of output feedback and for nonlinear systems. Regarding the latter extension, the alternative Lyapunov-based analysis of the problem presented in Appendix A suits well our purpose. One of the motivation to consider control problems over networks descends from problems of distributed coordination and control of large-scale systems. Investigating our approach to resilient control under DoS for eventbased coordination problems such as those in De Persis and Frasca (2013) represents another interesting research venue.
APPENDIX Appendix A. LYAPUNOV-BASED APPROACH
Lyapunov arguments provide an alternative analysis of the problem that is sometimes useful. Unless otherwise stated, the notation for this section is the same as in Section 3. Consider again the control system composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6) with control update rule (12). Given any positive definite matrix Q = Q ⊤ ∈ R nx×nx , let P be the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
Then, by taking V (x) = x ⊤ P x as a Lyapunov function, and computing it along the solution to (11), it is immediate to see that
hold for all t ∈ R ≥0 , with α 1 and α 2 equal to the smallest and largest eigenvalue of P , respectively, γ 1 equal to the smallest eigenvalue of Q, and γ 2 := K ⊤ B ⊤ P + P BK (cf. Tabuada (2007) ).
Consider first Θ(t) = [0, t)\Ξ(t), over which (12) holds by construction. In this case, simple calculations yielḋ
Consider next Ξ(t). In this case, as before, some intermediate steps are needed. Consider the n-th DoS interval H n . From Lemma 1 we have
Thus, for all t ∈ H n such that x(h n ) ≤ x(t) , one haṡ
where ω 2 := γ 2 (2 + σ)/α 1 . Conversely, for all t ∈ H n such that x(h n ) > x(t) , one haṡ
Combining the last two inequalities with (A.4), the following result can be established. Theorem 3. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under a state-feedback control as in (6). Given any positive definite matrix Q = Q ⊤ ∈ R nx×nx , let P be the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation Φ ⊤ P + P Φ + Q = 0 with Φ = A + BK. Let V (x) = x ⊤ P x, and let the control update parameter σ in (12) be such that
with γ 1 and γ 2 as in (A.3). Then, Σ is GES for any DoS sequence {h n } satisfying Assumption 1 with
where ω 1 = (γ 1 − γ 2 σ)/α 2 and ω 2 = γ 2 (2 + σ)/α 1 , and α 1 and α 2 as in (A.2). In particular, under the stated conditions, (7) holds true with constants α = e κ(ω1+ω2) α 2 /α 1 and
Proof. For notational convenience, let h −1 = τ −1 := 0. From (A.4) we have V (x(t)) ≤ e −ω1(t−hn−1−τn−1) V (x(h n−1 + τ n−1 )) (A.10) for all t ∈ [h n−1 + τ n−1 , h n [ with n ∈ N. In addition, (A.6) and (A.7) imply V (x(t)) ≤ e ω2(t−hn) V (x(h n )) (A.11) for all t ∈ H n with n ∈ N.
Combining the last two expressions and recalling the definitions of Θ(t) and Ξ(t), we get V (x(t)) ≤ e −ω1|Θ(t)| e ω2 |Ξ(t)| V (x(0)) = e −ω1t e (ω1+ω2) |Ξ(t)| V (x(0)) = e κ(ω1+ω2) e −[ω1−(ω1+ω2)/τ ] t V (x(0)) (A.12) where the first equality follows since |Θ(t)| = t − |Ξ(t)|. This establishes GES under the standing assumptions of the theorem. As for the computation of the constants, it is sufficient to observe that (A.12), along with (A.2), implies (15) is valid. Recall next that e(t) = x(t k(hn) ) − x(t) (B.1) for all t ∈ H n , n ∈ N, with x(t k(hn) ) representing the value of the process state at the last successful control update before H n . Since (12) holds true for all t / ∈ Ξ(t) and by continuity of x(·), one has e(h n ) ≤ σ x(h n ) when h 0 > 0 and for all n ∈ N 1 . Hence,
and (15) follows by applying the triangular inequality.
The proof of Theorem 1 rests on the following result, which is a simplified variant of the Gronwall type inequality for piecewise continuous functions considered in (Bainov and Simeonov, 1992, Theorem 16.4) . Lemma 2. Let {ℓ k }, k ∈ N, be a fixed sequence satisfying 0 ≤ ℓ 0 < ℓ 1 < ℓ 2 < . . . and lim k→∞ ℓ k = ∞. Suppose that for t ≥ ℓ 0 we have
3) where ξ : R ≥0 → R >0 is continuous; ω 1 : R ≥0 → R >0 is a nondecreasing function in R ≥0 ; ω 2 ∈ R ≥0 is a constant; and δ k (t) ∈ R ≥0 with k ∈ N 1 are nondecreasing functions in R ≥0 . Then ξ(t) ≤ ω 1 e ω2 (t−ℓ0) k∈N1: ℓ0<ℓ k <t (1 + δ k (t)) (B.4) for all t ≥ ℓ 0 . ✷ When δ k (t) = 0 for all t ∈ R ≥0 then (B.3) and (B.4) give rise to the standard Gronwall-Bellman inequality (Bainov and Simeonov, 1992 , Theorem 1.1).
The idea is then to apply Lemma 2 to the inequality obtained from the combination of (13), (14) and (24), with ξ(·) and {ℓ k } changed into x(·) and {h n }, respectively, using the latter to model discontinuities in the process behavior caused by DoS.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define ξ(t) := e λt x(t) (B.5) Thus, using (14) and (24), one can rewrite (13) as ξ(t) ≤ ω 1 + t 0 ω 3 ξ(s)ds + n(t) n=0 δ n (t)ξ(h n ) (B.6) Assume first h 0 > 0. The conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied by letting ℓ 0 = 0 and ℓ n+1 = h n for all n ∈ N, with δ n (t) nondecreasing in R ≥0 by construction. Thus ξ(t) ≤ ω 1 e ω3 t n(t) n=0 e (λ+ρ * )τn(t)
